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Abstract 
The first contribution of this paper is the 
presentation of a Pavelka-like formulation of 
possibilistic logic in which the language is 
naturally enriched by two connectives which 
represent negation ( •) and a new type of con­
junction ( 0). The space of truth values for 
this logic is the lattice of possibility functions, 
that, from an algebraic point of view, forms 
a quantal. A second contribution comes from 
the understanding of the new conjunction 
as the combination of tokens of information 
coming from different sources, which makes 
our language "dynamic" . A Gentzen calcu­
lus is presented, which is proved sound and 
complete with respect to the given seman­
tics. The problem of truth functionality is 
discussed in this context. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The distinction between truth-functional and non 
truth-functional logics have been widely stressed by 
several authors [Dubois, Lang and Prade 9 1], 
[Hajek et. al 94]. The first class contains many valued 
logics in the style of Lukasiewicz, and has been given 
a precise status since the work of Goguen and Pavelka 
(see [Pavelka 79]); while Pavelka proposed a general 
frame in which the set of truth values was a complete 
lattice ordered monoid, he limited his analysis to finite 
chains and to the unit interval of reals. 
The second class contains measure-based logics, 
where the underlying measure can have different na­
tures: a probability, a possibility, a belief func­
tion, etc. (see, for instance, [Fagin and Halpern 94], 
[Dubois, Lang and Prade 94], [Saffiotti 92]). It has 
been given a formal status in terms of modal log­
ics in [Hajek et. al 94]1 and [Voorbraak 93]. Links 
1 As a matter of facts Hajek does more than that, since 
he puts together a truth-functional and a measure based 
logic in the same framework. 
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to classical epistemic logics have been established in 
[Murai et al. 93]. 
In the present paper we show that possibilistic 
logic can be embedded in a many-valued (truth­
functional) logic, where the set of truth values is not 
the unit interval of real numbers, but a complete 
lattice made of possibility distributions (more pre­
cisely, a quanta0 2. Moreover, as in Pavelka and in 
[Takeuti and Titani 84], we introduce in the language 
a suitable subset of the truth values; we show that 
the resulting logic, which fits in fact in Pavelka's gen­
eral frame, contains possibilistic logic as expressed in 
[Dubois, Lang and Prade 94]. 
In this many-valued view the truth value of a formula 
is the set of possibility distributions which satisfy it 
(in the usual sense). Composition of formulae through 
logical connectives in the language has a semantical 
counterpart in the corresponding composition of these 
sets of possibility distributions. The trick of introduc­
ing truth values into the language, token from Pavelka, 
is used in this context to account for the measure val­
ues from inside the language. 
A second point of concern in our work is the dynamics 
of information. In the field of measure-based logics, 
it seems that most of the languages are static, in the 
sense that they perform inference on a unique informa­
tion state; no logical counterpart has been established 
to the combination of evidence which, semantically, 
is a change of information state3. In modal formu­
lations the 1\ operator between modal formulae like 
NaA can, in fact, be thought of as a connective repre­
senting expansion, which is a change (more precisely, a 
refinement) of the information state; however, no other 
dynamic connectives are available. 
2It is well known that it is not possible to make a com­
positional classical logic whose truth space is the unit in­
terval, since the unit interval cannot be imposed a Boolean 
structure (it can however be given a Complete Heyting Al­
gebra structure, so that it works as the truth value space 
of an intuitionistic logic, see [Takeuti and Titani 84]). 
3This is not completely true with Saffiotti 's Belief Func­
tion Logic, since the conjunction of BF-formulae corre­
sponds in some way to Dempster's combination on models 
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A parallel can be drawn with the representation of 
certain knowledge; in that case, since there is no way 
of weighing evidence from different sources, the only 
meaningful dynamic operators correspond to expan­
sion, revision or update. An interesting work in the 
direction of representing these operators as logical con­
nectives is [de Rijke 94] which seeks to capture the 
non-determinism of revision. The uncertain setting 
has to cope with a much wider set of operators, and 
we believe that it would be of a certain interest to 
explore their representation inside the language. For 
instance, it would be interesting to give a syntacti­
cal account of the Dempster-Shafer combination oper­
ator for belief functions (a syntactic characterization 
of Dempster conditionalization has been proposed in 
[ Alechina and Smets 94]), or of the Jeffrey condition­
alization operator for probabilities; in this paper we 
start this work from an easier task, which is the syn­
tactical representation of the Lukasiewicz combination 
operator in the possibilistic framework. 
Let us assume that a piece of evidence is modeled by a 
possibility distribution on a set of possible worlds; as 
reported in [Dubois and Prade 85], there are several 
ways of aggregating information, depending on the re­
lation among the sources of information, and on as­
sumptions on their reliability. In this paper we focus 
on two operators for combining possibility distribu­
tions: 1\ defined by ( 1r1 1\ 7rz) ( w) = 1r1 ( w) 1\ 7rz ( w) and 
the Lukasiewicz operator x, defined by (1r1 x 1r2)(w) = 
(1r1(w) + 7rz (w) - 1) V 0; both of these operators are 
T-norms. The first one, up to when the result re­
mains consistent, can be used to model expansion, 
i.e. the combination of coherent information (think 
for instance of tokens of information coming from the 
same source): we represent it syntactically by "&"; 
it corresponds to the set union of possibilistic formu­
lae in the logic of [Dubois, Lang and Prade 94], or to 
the 1\ between modal formulae in modal approaches. 
The second operator models combination of evidence 
coming from distinct sources: if the two evidences 
agree, combination yields an evidence stronger than 
both4. We introduce it in the language as "®", which 
has no explicit representation in standard possibilistic 
logic. Moreover, it is very natural to add to the lan­
guage a negation, which corresponds to the operation 
of fuzzy set complementation with respect to x. This 
approach, while owing much to modal approaches, as it 
can be argued from the semantics, differs from them in 
that it explicitly introduces numerical constants in the 
language (which, as we discussed above, are just some 
of the truth values), and in the semantics of negation, 
which we are going to discuss in some detail later. For 
the time being it suffice to say that modal negation 
deals with absence of information in some information 
4this role can also be played by the product · defined by 
(tr1 · 1r2)(w) = 1r1(w) · 1r2(w); in [Dubois and Prade 85] the 
authors claim that this operator models the combination 
of information from distinct and independent sources. The 
syntactical representation of this operator has been studied 
in [Boldrin 94]. 
state, while our negation represents actual disbelief. 
The result is a logic endowed with a sound and com­
plete Gentzen calculus; we named it Dynamic Possi­
bilistic Logic because of the dynamic interpretation we 
just gave. To improve the clarity of the paper, we chose 
to introduce the propositional system (DPL) first (par. 
2), and to extended it to the full predicative system 
(DPL*) in a second step (par 3). The reader could 
notice that our approach shares some features with 
Lehman's plausibility logic [Lehman 9 1]; the substan­
tial difference is that Lehman seeks to capture non­
monotonicity, and so plausibility logic enjoys contrac­
tion but not weakening and full cut. On the contrary, 
our connective ® is monotonic but not idempotent, 
since it is meant to represent combination of infor­
mation from different sources; consequently, our logic 
misses out contraction but allows for cut and weaken­
ing. As a matter of fact, the logic happens to fall in 
the field of substructural logics, since it can be seen 
as a specialization of Girard's linear logic [Girard 87]. 
This is not surprising, in the light of the informational 
interpretation of substructural logics pointed out in 
[Wansing 93]. 
2 THE PROPOSITIONAL SYSTEM 
2.1 THE SEMANTICS 
We assume the following language, where a for any 
a E [0, 1] are constants. The set of atomic propositions 
is named .Co. 
formula ::= atomic_proposition I a I --,formula I 
formula & formula I formula ® formula 
We take .C to be the set of formulae; it is convenient to 
define .C1 as the set of formulae with no occurrences of 
a constants for any a E (0, 1) -notice that 0 and 1 
are in .C1. We use upper case Latin letters (A, B, C, . .. ) 
for formulae, while reserving L, M, N for .C1-formulae, 
and upper case greek letters (r, � • ... ) for multisets of 
formulae; the greek letters a and {3 always represent 
real numbers in [0, 1]. 
We introduce some new symbols via the definitions: 
A � B =clef •(A ® ·B) 
A EB B =clef •( ·A&· B) 
A � B =clef •( ·A® ·B) 
The language is the same as in [Pavelka 79], where 
our & corresponds to 1\ and our ® to EB. Our choice of 
the connectives differs from Pavelka's, since we want 
to stress the proximity of our logic to substructural 
logics in the style of [Girard 87]. 
Let P denote the set of functions (which we call pos­
sibility distributions) from a non-empty set W to the 
real interval [0, 1], with the order :::; ( 1r1 :::; 7rz iff for 
any w it holds that 1r1 ( w) :::; 7rz ( w)); the lattice op­
erations V and 1\ on possibility functions are defined 
with respect to the order :S; (P, V, A) is a complete 
lattice. The operation x is defined by 1r = 1r1 x 1r2 
iff for any w 1r(w) = 0 V (1r1(w) + 1r2(w) - 1)). To 
define the semantics of negation, we make use of fuzzy 
set complementation with respect to x, which makes 
our negation coincide with Girard's, where the incon­
sistent set contains only the function identically zero. 
We need the following definitions: 
Def. 1 1. For any 1r, ! 1r ={a E P :  a::; 1r}. 
2. For any o: E [0, 1], o: is the function identically 
equal too: {in particular 1(w) = 1 and O(w) = 0 
for any w). 
3. For any G � P and H � P, G :::} H = {a 
'V1r (1r E G � 1r x a E H)}. 
4. For any G � P, GJ. = G:::} {0}. 
It can be easily verified that J.J. is a closure operator 
on 2P (see [Girard 87]). 
Theorem 1 For any G � P, let 1rc = VnEG7r; then: 
1. GJ. = {7r: 7r X 7rG = 0} 
2. GJ.J. =! 7rG 
The structure (P, x , 1) is a commutative monoid with 
unit, and j_ = {0} � P. Hence the structure 
(P, x, 1, _1_) is a phase space in Girard's sense. The 
closure operator is exactly the one of Girard, so the 
set Q = { G � P : G = GJ.J.} is the set of facts, and 
belongs to the class of Girard quantales as defined in 
[ Rosenthal 90]. 
A frame for our language is a couple: F = (W, Vo� 
where W is a nonempty set of worlds, Vo : £o � 2 
is a propositional assignment over the worlds which is 
extended to V: £1 � 2w, as usual. 
Def. 2 Given the frame F, let us define the function 
II ·I IF : £ � Q: 
I IPI IF =def {1r: Necn(V(p)) = 1} 
llo:IIF =def !o: 
I I..,A I IF =def II A ll� 
I IA & BIIF =def IIA I IF n IIBIIF 
IIA® BIIF =def I IAIIF X IIBIIF 
where Necn : 2w � [0, 1] is the necessity function as­
sociated to the possibility distribution 1r: N ecn(X) = 
1 - V w(lX 1r(w). The x product between sets is the 
point to point product. 
It can be verified that : 
I IA�BIIF 
IIA EB BI!F 
I IA �BIIF 
IIA I IF:::} I IBI IF 
I IAIIF v I IBI IF 
( I IA I IF + IIBIIF) A 1 
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I ILIIF 
llo: � LIIF = 
{1r: Necn(V(L)) = 1} for any L E £1 
{1r: Necn(V(L)) 2: o:} for any L E £1 
It follows from theorem 2 that IIA I I as above defined is 
a fact (i.e. belongs to Q) for any A E £. It is worth 
noting that the subset B = { 1r : (Vw E W) ( 1r( w) E 
{ 0, 1})} is a Boolean algebra contained in Q. For this 
reason, £1-formulae (whose value is in B - see the 
fourth equivalence above) behave classically. 
The fifth equivalence is very important, since 
it states that the formula o: � L has the 
same meaning as the possibilistic formula (L, o:) in 
[Dubois, Lang and Prade 94], or as the formula in 
modal flavour No:L in the style of Hajek. 
Def. 3 A model is a couple K = (F, 1r) where F is a 
frame. We say that K f= A iff 1r E I IA IIF· A formula 
A is valid in F iff for any model K in the frame F ,  
K f= A or, equivalently (see lemma 1 in paragraph 4) 
iff 1 E I IA I IF· 
In a fixed frame a formula o: � A is true in the mod­
els whose possibility distribution gives A at least o: 
support; a formula ..,A is true in the models which 
are inconsistent with the models for A; a formula 
A & B is true in those models which fit both A and 
B; and, eventually, a formula A 0 B is true in any 
model whose possibility distribution is the product of 
one of an A-model and one of a B-model. Since the 
lattice P is complete, we can establish a correspon­
dence U F : £ � P between formulae and their least 
informative model in a frame (keep in mind that least 
informative means higher in the order :S): 
Up(A) =def V 1r 
nEIJAI F 
Theorem 2 Given a frame F ,  IIA I IF = I IA I I�J. = 
! Up(A). Moreover, the following statements hold: 
1. Up(o:) = o: 
2. Up(L) = >.w. { � 
formula L 
3. Up(..,A) = 1- Up(A) 
if w E V(L) 
otherwise 
4. Up(A & B) = Up(A) A Up(B) 
for any £1-
5. Up(A®B) = Up(A)xUp(B) = (Up(A)+Up(B)-
1) v 0 
6. Up(A EB B) = Up(A) V Up(B) 
7. Up(A � B) = (Up(A) + Up(B)) A 1 
8. Up(A �B) = (1 - Up(A) + Up(B)) A 1 
To define the semantic entailment relation, we first 
consider the entailment between formulae: 
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A I= B iff for any frame F, Up(A):::; Up(B) 
We can now state the following 
Theorem 3 Let the frame C = (We, V(r) be de­
fined as follows: We is the set of classical proposi­
tional valuations for Co (i. e. the set of junctions 
from Co to {True, False}) and V0e(p) = { w E We : 
w I= p (classically)}. Then Uc(A) :::; Uc(B) implies 
Up(A) :::; Up(B) for any frame F. 
An important consequence of the theorem above is 
that we can restrict our attention to a unique quantal, 
which is the one made from the set of possibility dis­
tributions over the set We, via the closure operation. 
In fact, we can define the semantic entailment relation 
as follows (here and in the following we write U(A) for 
Uc(A)): 
A I= B iff U(A) :::; U(B) 
Eventually, since the intended meaning of the sequent 
f f-- �is ®AEr A -+ �BEt:..B, then we say that the 
sequent r f--� is valid iff ®AH A I=� BEt:..B. 
Let us now briefly comment on negation. Possibilistic 
models on the same frame represent a state of infor­
mation about the possible worlds of the frame; they 
are informationally ordered: 1r1 :::; 1r2 means that 1r1 is 
more informative then 1r2, since it better constrains the 
set of possible worlds. Since a formula is interpreted in 
the least informative information state which satisfies 
it, we have two possible readings for negation: the first 
is the modal one, which refers to information which is 
absent in a given information state. In this case the 
statement K I= •NaL must be read as: "in the given 
state of information it is not possible to prove that L 
is necessary at least a (while it may become possible 
in a refinement of the information state)" . The sec­
ond interpretation for negation, which we use in our 
logic, is an internal one, in the sense that the statement 
K I= -, (a -+ L) is read as: "in the given state of infor­
mation we definitely refuse to accept that L be neces­
sary at least a (and no refinement of this information 
state will allow to prove the opposite)". The formula 
• (a -+ L) then expresses an effective token of informa­
tion, and does not deal with absence of information. 
Note that, if applied to a classical framework, this sec­
ond reading would make -,0£ equivalent to D·L, but 
this is not the case here. Moreover, the reader can 
verify that there are models with non-zero possibility 
functions which satisfy both A and ·A; all of these 
functions are, however, smaller than 0.5. So we tol­
erate that a partially consistent information state can 
support both a token of information and its negation. 
2.2 THE PROOF SYSTEM DPL 
The proof system will be given in a Gentzen-style cal­
culus, since it is the most comfortable way to deal with 
multisets (remember that, because of the absence of 
contraction, it does matter how many times a formula 
is given). Another reason for choosing this calculus 
is the possible generalization to cases in which other 
rules are not accepted (in the style of plausibility logic 
[Lehman 9 1]). The DPL calculus consists of four parts: 
structural rules, logical rules, an axiom for distributiv­
ity, and three further "numerical" axioms for charac­
terizing the behaviour of constants. 
Structural rules: 
id) A f-A cut) rr-B,t:.. r
',Br-t:..' 
r,r'l-t:..,t:..' 
exL) r,B,A,t:..I-A exR) rl-t:..B,A,A r,A,B,t:..I-A rr-t:..,A,B,A 
wL) rr-.c:.. wR) rr-.c:.. r,AI-t:.. rr-t:..,A 
abs) r,Bf-L,t:.. L E £1 r,BI-L®B,t:.. 
Logical rules: 
&) r,AI-t:.. r,BI-t:.. rr-A,t:.. rr-B,t:..
' 
r,A&BI-t:.. r,A&BI-t:.. ri-A & B,t:..,t:..' 
®) 
r,A,BI-t:.. rr-A,t:.. r'I-B,t:..' 
r,A®BI-t:.. r,r'I-A®B,l:l.,l:l.' 
Ell) 
r,AI-t.. r,Br-t.. rr-A,t. rr-B,t.. 
r,BE!)AI-t.. ri-A$B,t.. ri-A$B,t.. 
'l'il) 
r,AI-t:.. r' ,BI-t.' rr-A,B,t. 
r,r' ,A 1){ Bl-t.,t:..' ri-A 1){ B,t. 
--+) rr-A,t. r
',BI-t:..' r,AI-B,t.. 
r,r' ,A--+BI-t.,t.' ri-A--+B,t. 
�) rr-A,t.
 r,AI-t.. 
r,�Ar-t. rr-�A,t. 
1) rr-t.. r1-1, t.. r,ll-t.. 
0) r,or-t.. 
Distributivity: 
®-& distr) (A® C) & (B ®C) 1-(A & B) ® C 
Numerical rules: 
S') 
® def) 
�def) 
Notes: 
(3 f-- 0: 
0: @ (3 -1f-- "Y 
-.a: f--"Y 
for any f3 ::::; o. 
where -y = ( o. + f3 - 1) V 0 
where -y = 1 - o. 
1. Absorption is a weak form of contraction for £1-
formulae; consider, in fact, the following deriva­
tion, where L E £1: 
Lf--L L, Lf-- B 
L f--L ® L 
abs) L ® L f--B ®L) 
L f--B 
cut) 
By the way, the rule abs) is stronger than con­
traction on £1-formulae since, in exactly the same 
way, we also have the following (which is very 
much akin to Lehman's cumulative cut): 
Af-- L A,Lf-- B 
Af--B 
2. Rule 0-& distr) does not hold in linear logic, since 
it is specific to the possibility function semantics. 
3. If we omit numerical rules, the calculus deals 
with possibilistic logic with an arbitrary prod­
uct among possibility functions whose unit is 1, 
with the only restriction (due to weakening) that 
7f1 X 7f2 :::; 7f1 1\ 1f2. Any involution rv such that 
7fX rv 7f = 0 works as negation. Numerical 
rules force the times operator to represent the 
Lukasiewicz product, and the negation the cor­
responding fuzzy complementation. 
4. It should be noted that from absorption) and S') 
it is possible to derive for any A and B in £1 and 
for any f3 :::; a the following sequents that strictly 
correspond to the rules GMP) and S) explicitly 
stated in [Dubois, Lang and Prade 94]: 
MP) A &  (A---+ B) f- B 
GMP) (a ---+ A)&(,8---+ (A---+ B)) f- (a&,B)---+ B 
s) a ---+ A f- ,8 ---+ A 
5. Also the following two sequents, which will turn 
out useful, can be derived as proved in lemma 3 
(L and Mare in £1)): 
®red) (a ---+ L) ® (,8 ---+ M) -If- ¢ 
�red) -,(a---+ L) -If- a & ...,£ 
where ¢ = (,8 ---+ (L ---+ M)) & (a ---+ (M ---+ 
L)) & ((a 7'8 ,8) ---+ (L EB M)) .  
6. We remind the reader that distributivity of® with 
respect to EB, i.e. the sequent (AEBB)® C  + (A® 
C) EB ( B ® C) holds by the logical rules; we shall 
refer to it as ®-EB distr). In fact, also the right-to­
left direction of ®-& distr) can be obtained from 
the logical rules. Similarly, ...., def ) rule works also 
in the right-to-left direction. 
7. The rules weakening), EB), 7'8 ) and ---+) can be 
dropped in a minimal presentation. 
Soundness of this calculus is easily proved by induction 
on the proof length; to prove completeness we use this 
theorem, which provides a normal form to the formulae 
of the language DPL: 
Theorem 4 Any formula A is provably equivalent in 
the calculus DPL to an &-formula, i. e. a formula 
A ' = &iEI(ai---+ Li) where Li are £1-formulae. 
It should be noted that this theorem (whose proof 
is constructive) guarantees that there is a translation 
of our language into standard possibilistic logic (and 
vice-versa), since the formula &iEI(ai ---+ Li) can be 
thought of as the equivalent of {(Li, ai) : i E J} in the 
language of Dubois and colleagues. 
Moreover, the presence of ® endows DPL with a dy­
namic dimension: assume you are given information 
tokens from distinct sources; to merge them, you sim­
ply connect the tokens by ®. Reduction of a formula 
to the normal form (the &-formula) can be seen as 
the effective process of merging information. The fact 
that the reduction process is not so trivial (see the 
proof of theorem 4) makes it clear that there is some 
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work to do for the combination of information, and this 
work is automatically performed by the proof system 
of DPL. It may be worth observing that reducibility 
of DPL formulae seems to be a very fortunate circum­
stance due to the simplicity of possibility theory; there 
is not guarantee, in general, that this process can be 
performed on logics based on more complex measures, 
like belief functions. We state then the main theorem: 
Theorem 5 The DPL calculus is sound and complete 
with respect to the given semantics, i.e., for any closed 
multiset r and .6., the sequent r f- .6. is proved iff 
r F= .6.. 
3 THE PREDICATIVE SYSTEM 
3.1 THE SEMANTICS 
We enrich the propositional language with \!-formulae. 
c is the set of individual constants and n that of 
predicate symbols; an atomic formula has the form 
R(h, . . .  , tn) , where ti are either individual constants 
or variables. £0 is the set of atomic formulae. 
formula :: = atomic_formula I a I ...., formula I formula 
& formula I formula ® formula I \lx formula 
As before, we take £ to be the set of formulae and £1 
the set of formulae with no occurrences of a constants. 
Symbols ---+ and EB are defined as in the previous sec­
tion; we introduce: 3xA(x) =def -,\fx-,A(x) 
In the predicative system we took a general modal se­
mantics and then showed that it was possible to con­
sider just a canonical model (theorem 3) without loss 
of generality. This time we will not introduce a gen­
eral modal predicative semantics, since it would be 
very complex. We consider from the beginning just 
the canonical models, and define validity with respect 
to them. Let M(D) denote the set of classical first or­
der models for the language £1 on the domain D; each 
element w E M(D) has the form (D, Fe, FR) where 
Fe and FR are the interpretations of individual con­
stants and relation symbols. P(D) denote the set of 
possibility distributions from M (D) to the real inter­
val [0, 1]; P(D) is a particular choice for the set Win 
section 2, so we make use of definition 1 and theorem 
1. It maintains the structure of phase space as in the 
propositional case, and we can build on it the quanta! 
Q(D) = {G � P(D): G = Gj_j_ }. 
Let a be an arbitrary assignment for the variables on 
D; by a[xju] we mean the function which differs from 
a only on x, which is mapped to u. We define, for any 
£1-formula A: 
ModD,17(A) =def {wE M(D): w,a f= A} 
Again, for a fixed domain D and an assignment a, we 
define a function II · IID,u : £ ---+ 2'P(D) as follows: 
IIR(t) IID,u {1r : Nec"'(ModD,u(R(t) ) )  = 1} 
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llallv,u 
11-.AIIv,u 
IIA& BIID,<T 
IIA ® BIID,<T 
IIVxA(x) llv,u 
It is still true that: 
IIA - BIID,<T 
IIA El1 BIID,<T 
II A� BIID,<T 
II:JxA(x)llv,u = 
IILIID,<T 
lla - Lllv,u 
!a 
IIAIIiJ,u 
IIAIIv,u n IIBIIv,u 
IIAIID,<T X IIBIID,<T 
n IIA(x)llv,u[x/u] 
uED 
IIAIID,<T =:} IIBIID,<T 
IIAIIv,u v IIBIIv,u 
( IIAIIv,u + IIBIIv,u) A 1 
U IIA(x)llv,u[x/u] 
uED 
{11": Nec.,..(Modv,u(L)) = 1} 
{11": Necrr(Modv,u(L)) �a} 
where t =< t1 , . . .  , tn >, 71" E P(D) and L E .C1 . 
A possibilistic model model is a couple K = (D, 7r) . 
We say that K f= A iff 71" E IIAIIv,u for any assignment 
a. Notice that, if A is a closed formula, then IIAIIv,u 
does not change for any choice of a; so for a closed 
formula A we let IIAIIv = IIAIID,u· We define, as in 
the propositional case: 
Uv,u(A) =def V 71" 
rrE IIA IIv,.,. 
Theorem 6 Given a frame F and an assignment a, 
IIAIIv,u = IIAIIiJ� =! Uv,u(A). Moreover, the follow­
ing statements hold: 
1. Uv,u(a) =a 
2. Uv,u(L) = ..\w. { � 
any .C1 -formula L 
if wE Modv,u(L) 
otherwise 
3. Uv,u(-.A) =rv Uv,u(A) =def 1- Uv,u(A) 
4- Uv,u(A&B) = Uv,u(A)I\Uv,u(B) 
for 
5. Uv,u(A®B) = Uv,u(A) X Uv,u(B) = (Uv,u(A) + 
Uv,u(B)- 1) V 0 
6. Uv,u(VxA(x)) = 1\uED Uv,u(x/uj(A(x)) 
7. Uv,u(A E11 B)= Uv,u(A) V Uv,u(B) 
8. Uv,u(A'l'8B) = (Uv,u(A) + Uv,u(B)) 1\1 
9. Uv,u(A- B)= (1- Uv,u(A) + Uv,u(B)) 1\1 
10. Uv,u(3xA(x)) = VuED Uv,u(x/uj(A(x)) 
For any closed formula A and B we have: 
A f= B iff Uv(A)::; Uv(B) for any domain D 
Notice that semantical entailment is defined with re­
spect to all the domains D; this is a difference from 
the propositional case, in which we only had to refer to 
the canonical frame C. In algebraic terms this means 
that we have to check validity with respect to a class 
of quantales, and not only to a specific one. 
3.2 THE PREDICATIVE PROOF SYSTEM 
DPL* 
We only have to add some rules to the propositional 
calculus: 
Structural rules: Unchanged 
Logical rules: Add the following rules: 
'V) r,A(t)l-.0. ri-A(x),.o. * r,'VxA(x)l-.0. ri-'VxA(x),.O. 
3) r,A(x)l-.0. * ri-A(t),.O. r,3xA(x)I-.O. rl-3xA(x),.O. 
* if X is not free in r and � 
Distributivity: Add the following rule: 
®- \f distr ) \fxA(x) ® C --If- \fx(A(x) ®C) 
is not free in C. 
Numerical rules: Unchanged 
We extend theorem 4 to the predicative case: 
if X 
Theorem 1 Any closed formula A is provably equiva­
lent in the calculus DPL* to an &-formula, i. e. a for-
mula A'= &iEI(ai- Li) where Li are .C1 -formulae. 
To prove validity we only have to check the new rules; 
the proof of completeness does not change w.r.t. that 
of the propositional system. Eventually, we have: 
Theorem 8 The DPL* calculus is sound and com­
plete with respect to the given semantics, i. e., for any 
closed multiset of formulae r and�' the sequent r f-� 
is proved iff r F= �. 
4 PROOFS OF THEOREMS 
All the omitted proofs can be found in 
[Boldrin and Sossai 95]. 
Lemma 1 If 11"1 E IIAIIF and 11"2 ::; 11"1, then also 11"2 E 
IIAIIF· 
Proof By induction on the complexity of A: 
A= a : 11"1 E llaiiF =! a implies 11"1 ::; a. Then 
11"2 ::; 11"1 ::; a, and so 11"2 E llaiiF· 
A=p: Since 11"1 E IIPIIF, we have VwflV(p)7r1(w) = 
0. Since 11"2 ::; 11"1, V wflV(p) 11"2(w) ::; 
V wflV(p) 11"1(w) = 0, hence 11"2 E IIPIIF· 
A= -.B : Since 11"1 E IIAIIF = IIBII�, we have that 
for any a E IIBIIF, 11"1 x a = 0. Then for any 
a E IIBIIF, 11"2 xa::; 11"1 xa = 0, and so 11"2 E IIBII�-
A = C & B : Since 1r1 E IIC 1\ BIIF, by clef. 1r1 E 
IICIIF and 1r1 E IIBIIF· By inductive hypothesis 
1r2 E IICIIF and 1r2 E IIBIIF, and then 1r2 E IIC 1\ 
BIIF· 
A= C ® B : Let 1r� E IICIIF, 7rf E IIBIIF and 1r1 = 
1rf x 1rf. Take 1r 2 = 7rf, and 7r� defined as: 
1( ) _ { 1-7rf(w) + 1r2(w) 7f2 w - 0 
if 1r2(w) # 0 
otherwise 
We have then 1r� E IICIIF by inductive hyp., since 
1r� :::; 1r! (easy to see) and 1r� E IIBIIF· Moreover, 
1r2 x 1r2 = 1r2. Hence we have proved that 1r2 E 
IIC ®BIIF· 
so the proof is over. D 
Proof of Theorem 1 
1. 2) Take 1r such that 1r x 7rG = 0; then, for any 
()" E G, 7f X ()" :::; 7f X 1fQ = 0, so 7f E Gl. 0 
s;;;) Take 1r such that 1r x 7rG # 0; then there 
is a wo such that 7r(wo)7ra(wo) > 0. Since 
nc(wo) = V rrEG O"(wo), there exists a O" E G 
with O"(w0) > 0; for this O", 1r x O" > 0, so 
1r � Gj_. 
2. 2) Take 1r E1 7rGi then 1r :::; 1rc, hence for any 
O" such that O" x 1rc = 0, we have: O" x 1r :::; 
0" X 1fQ = 0 
s;;;) Take 1r � 1 1r c; then 1r 1:. 1r c, so there exists 
a wo such that 7r(wo) > 7rc(wo). Take now O" 
defined as follows: O"(w) = 1-7ra(w); clearly, 
it is O" x 1rc = 0, which implies O" E Gl. by the 
first point; it is also O"(wo) = 1 -7rc(wo) > 
0 since 7ra(wo) < 1, but O"(wo)7r(wo) > 
O"(wo)7rc(wo)7rc = 0, so O" x 1r > 0, and 
7r � Gl.l. 
so the proof is over. D 
Proof of theorem 2 Let Up(A) = V IIAIIFi we prove 
that IIAIIF =1 Up(A), since we know from theorem 1 
that IIAII�l. =1 V IIAIIF· 
s;;; ) is obvious. 
2 ) We prove by induction that Up(A) E IIAIIFi then, 
by lemma 1, we know that any 1r so that 1r :::; U F (A) 
is in IIAIIF· (We omit the subscripts F): 
A= o:: Clearly, Up(o:) = o:, in fact: for any 1r E 
llo:ll, 7r :So:; and o: E llo:ll · 
A= L .C1-formula: We show that Up(L)(w) = 
{ 1 if wE V(L) 
0 if w � V(L) 
• For any 1r E IlLII = {1r : Nec11"(V(L)) = 1} 
it must be the case that Vw �V(L) 1r(w) = 0. 
T his means that for any w � V(L), 1r(w) = 0; 
for wE V(L), it is certainly 1r(w):::; 1. 
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• The characteristic function of V(L) stands in 
IlLII (easy to verify). 
A= ·B: We show that U(•B) = 1 -U(B): 
• For any 1r E II·BII, it is (theorem 1) 1r x 
U(B) = 0 V (1r + U(B)-1)  = 0, and so 1r + 
U(B) -1 :::; 0. which implies 1r :::; 1 -U(B). 
• 1-U(B) E II·BII , since U(B) x (1-U(B)) = 
0. 
A= B & C: We show that U(B & C) = U(B)I\ U(C): 
• Take 1r E IIB&CII; by definition, 7r E liB II and 
1r E IICII · So it is 1r :::; U(B) and 1r :::; U(C) 
and, eventually, 1r:::; U(B) 1\ U(C). 
• U(B) 1\ U(C) :::; U(B) and U(B) 1\ U(C) :::; 
U(C); by inductive hyp. U(B) E IIBII and 
U(C) E II Gil so, by lemma 1, U(B) 1\ U(C) E 
IIBII and U(B) 1\ U(C) E IICII· So, by defini­
tion, U(B) 1\ U(C) E liB & Gil . 
A= B ®C: We show that U(B®C) = U(B)xU(C): 
• Take 1r E IIB®CII; then there exist 1r1 E IIBII 
and 1r2 E IICII so that 1r = 1r1 x 1r2. Then 
1r1 :::; U(B) and 1r2 :::; U(C). By monotonicity 
of x, 1r:::; U(B) x U(C). 
• U(B) x U(C) E liB ® Gil, since it is the 
product of two functions which (by induction 
hyp.) stand respectively in IIBII and IICII · 
The proof by induction is over; using definitions we 
can also calculate: 
U(B EB C)= U(·(·B&·C)) = U(B) V U(C). 
U(FP'8C) = U(·(·B ®·C))= (U(B) + U(C)) 1\1. 
U(B--> C)= U(•(B®·C)) = (1-U(B)+U(C))I\1 . 
so the proof is over. D 
Lemma 2 Let B -11- &iEI(/3i --> Li) where Li are .Cl­
formulae, and, for any J s;;; I ,  O:J = • ffij�J /3j and 
MJ = • 
( 
&jE JLj & &j�J'Lj) (MJ E .C1). Then 
the following derivation holds: 
Lemma 3 The following sequent can be obtained in 
DPL for L and M in .C1: 
((3--+ (L--+ M)) & 
(a: --+ (M--+ L)) & 
((a: 7)/ (3) --+ (L $ M)) 
((a:--+ (M --+ L)) ® ((3--+ (L--+ M))) & 
f- ((a:--+ (M--+ L)) ® ((3--+ (L $ M))) & 
((a:--+ (M $ L)) ® ((3--+ (L--+ M))) & 
((a:--+ (M $ L)) ® ((3--+ (L $ M))) 
Lemma 4 The following equivalence can be proved in 
DPL for any .C1-formulae L and M: 
®red) (a --> L) ® ({3 --> M) -11- ({3 --> (L --> 
M)) & (a--> (M--> L)) & ((a7)!{3)--> (L EB M)) 
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Lemma 5 The following equivalence can be proved in 
DPL for any £1-formula L: 
-, red) •(a--+ L) -H- a & -,£ 
Proof of theorem 5 (soundness and complete­
ness) Soundness is easy to prove, by induction on the 
derivation; as a matter of fact, logical and structural 
rules (apart of weakening and absorption) are sound 
because the interpretation structure is a Girard quan­
ta! (see [ Girard 87]), with the proviso that 1 coincides 
with T. For the others the proof is straightforward: 
weakening) : Assume U(®�) � U(B); then 
U(@� Q9 A) = U(@�) x U(A) � U(@�) � 
U(B) because of monotonicity of x. 
absorption) : We prove that if U(A) � U(L) then 
U(A) x U(L) = U(A). By theorem 2 U(L)(w) E 
{0, 1}, hence we have (U(A) x U(L))(w) = 
(U(A)(w) + U(L)(w)- 1) V 0 = 
{
 
U(A)(w) if U(L)(w) = 1 h U(A)( ) 1\ 0 if U(L)(w) = 0 ence w 
U(L)(w) = U(A)(w) 
®-& distr) : U((A&B)®C) = U(A&B) x U(C) = 
(U(A & B) + U(C)- 1) v 0 = ((U(A) 1\ U(B)) + 
U(C)-1) v 0 = ((U(A) + U(C)- 1) 1\ (U(B) + 
U(C)-1))VO = ((U(A)+U(C)-1)VO)I\((U(B)+ 
U(C)-1)VO) = (U(A)xU(C))I\(U(B)xU(C)) = 
U(A Q9 C) 1\ U(B Q9 C) = U((A Q9 C) & (B Q9 C)) 
S'): U({3) = {3 �a = U(a) 
Q9 def ) : U(a Q9 {3) = U(a) x U(f3) = a x {3 = "Y 
where "' = (a + f3 - 1) V 0 
-, def ) : U(•a) = 1- U(a) = 1- a = "Y where 
"'= 1-a. 
Let us now come to completeness; assume UF(A) � 
UF(B); using theorem 4 we have A -H- &iEI(ai --+ Li) 
and B -U- & jEJ(f3j --+ Mj)· Our hypothesis can 
be equivalently formulated as uc&iEJ(ai --+ Li)) � 
U((f3j --+ Mj)) for any j E J. We prove by induc­
tion on the number of elements in I that, under this 
hypothesis, &iEI(ai --+ Li) f--(f3j--+ Mj)· 
I I = 1 : We have then U(a --+ L) � U(/3 --+ M). 
There are just two cases in which this can happen: 
V(L) � V(M) and f3 � a. Then by classical 
completeness we have L f-- M, and by rule 
S') we have f3 f-- a; hence: 
[3f--a Lf--M 
a--+ L,f3 f--M 
a--+Lf--{3--+M 
f3 = 0. In this case 
Of--M 
f--0--+M 
a--+Lf--0--+M 
I I= n : We have uc&i<n-l(ai --+ Li) & (an --+ 
Ln)) � U(/3--+ M). Using theorem 2 we have: 
U(&i�n-l(ai--+ Li) & (an--+ Ln))(w) = 
{ 
U(&i<n-l(ai --+ Li))(w) if wE V(Ln) 
( 1- a�) 1\ U(&i�n-l(ai --+ Li))(w) otherwise 
{ 1 if wE V(M) U ({3 --+ M) = 1 -f3 otherwise 
It follows that there are two possibilities: 
• U(&i<n-l(ai--+ Li))(w) � 1 -f3 for any w 
such that w � V(Ln) and w � V(M). In this 
case it happens thatU(&i<n-l(ai--+ Li)) � 
U ({3 --+ M). Then we can make the simple 
derivation 
• If the first possibility does not hold, then 
it must be the case that 1 -an � 1 - [3, 
i.e. f3 � an; we also have (this is true in 
any case): U(&i<n-l(ai --+ Li)) � U(/3--+ 
(MEfbLn)). By inductive hypothesis we have 
&i�n-l(ai--+ Li) f--{3--+ (M EB •Ln) 
Then we have the following (notice that from 
f3 � a we have {3 f-- an, hence an --+ Ln f-­
{3 --+ Ln): 
&i<n-l{et; -> L;) f- {3-> (M $ �Ln) Ctn-+ Ln f- {3-> Ln 
&i<n-det; -> L;) & {etn -> Ln) 1- ({3-> (M $ �Ln)) & ({3-> Ln) 
&i<n(et; ""'L;) 1-{3""' ((M $ �Ln) & Ln) 
&i$n(et; ""'L;) 1- {3 ..... M 
From &iEI(ai --+ Li) f--(f3j --+ Mj) for any j E J we 
get &iEJ(ai--+ Li) f-- &jEJ(f3j--+ Mj), hence L f-- M. 
0 
Lemma 6 (predicative homologue of lemma 1). If 
1!'1 E IIAIIv,u and 1!'2 � 1!'1, then also 1!'2 E IIAIID,u· 
Proof By induction on the complexity of A. The only 
case which must be considered is A = 'VxB(x), since 
all the other cases do not change with respect to the 
propositional proof (lemma 1). 
A = 'VxB(x): Since 1!'1 E IIVxA(x)llv,u = 
AuED IIA(x) IID,u[x/u], it is 1!'1 E IIA(x) IID,u[x/u] for all 
u E D, and so (ind. hyp.) 1!'2 E IIA(x)IID,u[x/u] 
for all u E D, hence 1!'2 E AuED IIA(x)llv,u[x/u] = 
II'VxA(x)IID,u· 0 
Proof of theorem 6 (predicative homologue of the­
orem 2). Let Uv,u(A) = V IIAIIv,u; we prove that 
\\A\\v,a =! Uv,a(A), since we know from theorem 1 
that \\AI\:5� =! V \\AIIv,a· 
<;;; ) is obvious. 
2 ) We prove by induction that Uv,a(A) E IIA\\v,ai 
then, by lemma 4, we know that any 1r so that 1r � 
Uv,a(A) is in 1\A\Iv,a· The only case which must be 
considered is A = V'xB(x), since all the others do not 
change w.r.t. the propositional case. 
We show that U (V'xB(x) = 1\uED Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)): 
• Take 7r E 1\V'xB(x)\\ = 1\uED 1\B(x)llv,a[x/u] i then 
7r � Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)) for any u E D, hence 7r � 
1\uED Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)). 
• 1\uED Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)) � Uv,a[x/uj(B(x)) for any 
u E D. By ind. hyp, Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)) E 
\\(B(x))\\v,a[xfu] for any u E D; by lemma 6 
, 1\uED Uv,a[x/uj(B(x)) E II (B(x))llv,a[xfu] for 
any u E D, and so 1\uED Uv,a[xfuj(B(x)) E 
nuED 1\(B(x))\ID,a[x/u] = 1\ V'xB(x)\\. 
so the proof is over. 0 
Proof of theorem 8 (predicative homologue of the­
orem 5). To prove soundness we only have to check 
the new rules for validity; the V'-rules are in fact valid 
because of validity of linear logic. The only rule which 
has to be verified is: 
0-V'distr) V'xA(x)0C-1f-V'x(A(x)0C) if x 
is not free in C. 
For any D: Uv(V'xA(x) ® 
C)= Uv(V'xA(x)) x Uv(C) = 1\uED Uv,[xfuj(A(x)) X 
Uv(C) = 1\uED(Uv,[x/u] (A(x)) X Uv,[x/uj(C)) == 
1\uED(Uv,[xfuJ(A(x) 0 C))= Uv(V'x(A(x) 0 C)) 
Completeness is proved exactly as completeness of the 
propositional system, where references to theorem 4 
are substituted by references to theorem 7. 0 
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